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Abstract: In the recent national election in April 2018 in Hungary, the incumbent party (Fidesz) won again. 
During the campaign period, some of the media were full of stories about the scandals and corruption affairs 
of Fidesz. However, election results showed that these scandals did not decrease incumbent party support. 
What is the potential explanation for this? During the election campaign, we conducted an online survey 
experiment in Hungary, giving different treatments to respondents within the different sub-samples. The 
former were asked to read an article about a relevant corruption affair connected to different political actors. 
Our main hypothesis was that if people hear about scandals related to the government, support for the 
incumbent party will decrease. Results of the fitted logistic regression models suggest that information about 
incumbent-related corruption scandals did not affect voting for the incumbents. The most interesting result 
was that dominantly pro-government media consumers were more likely to vote for Fidesz after treatment 
compared to the control group. We thus think that the selection of information, the perceived credibility 
of sources, and information processing were influenced by partisanship.  In a natural reaction, partisan 
respondents recalled their party identity and tried to respond to questions from the related viewpoints. 
Keywords: corruption, information hypothesis, trade-off hypothesis, incumbent support, experimental 
research
Introduction
The negative effects of political corruption are widely known. Overall, it decreases 
economic performance and weakens trust and confidence in institutions and 
the government (Mishler – Rose 2001, Anderson – Tverdova 2003). Widespread 
malfeasance can create significant disillusionment with the whole political system 
(Seligson 2006, Olson 2014). One the one hand, if people do not believe they can 
change a corrupt situation, electoral participation may decrease (Manzetti and Wilson 
2007), while on the other hand, corruption may also lead to mobilization against the 
incumbent party (Kostadinova 2009). 
Eastern Europe is a good area to examine how corruption affects political 
participation and the electoral arena. Between 2000 and 2010 corruption and scandals 
were a major issue in 70 percent of the elections in this region that were analyzed and 
the typical Eastern European voter perceives that their politicians are more likely to 
be corrupt than in the rest of Europe (Klasjna et al. 2016). Based on Transparency 
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International’s Corruption Index, Hungary is one of the most tainted countries in this 
region as far as corruption is concerned (Jávor – Jancsis 2016). Hungary was thirty-
ninth on the list in 2007, and had slipped to sixty-sixth by 2017.1 National elections 
were held in Hungary on April 8, 2018. Fidesz, the right-conservative party, has been 
in power since 2010 in Hungary and in the last few years the media has reported 
on several corruption scandals involving the ruling party. Even the son-in-law of the 
Prime Minister was accused of corruption in a European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
report related to suspicious procurement activities.2 The opposition parties have tried 
to build their election campaign around this government malfeasance, and in social 
media these accusations have generated a lot of discussion (Index 2018). After a very 
intensive campaign, the turnout rate in 2018 reached 70 percent (the second highest 
since the regime change in 1990). However, this high participation level was not the 
result of a mobilized opposition but rather to the unexpectedly strong turnout of 
incumbent supporters. Fidesz received nearly half of all votes, and benefited from an 
increase in the number of voters by 5 percent, or 400,000 people. Why is it that the 
corruption accusations did not harm the incumbent party? One possible explanation 
is that due to the highly centralized pro-government media system in Hungary 
(Bajomi 2013), some voters live in such a closed media bubble that they did not hear 
about these scandals in the news. Another explanation is that incumbent voters 
evaluate corruption as irrelevant because of their own personal gains or an overall 
positive evaluation of economic conditions.
Based on an online survey experiment conducted before the election, we tested 
whether information about the government and the scandals involving Fidesz 
politicians might decrease support for the incumbent party. In this paper, we 
present the result of this survey experiment and offer a possible explanation for the 
unexpectedly high level of support for the incumbent party. 
Theoretical Background 
Corruption can be hard to quantify, and it is also hard to identify its exact boundaries. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, we can distinguish between experiential corruption 
and perceived corruption. The prior is usually connected with minor or petty issues, 
while the latter is the consequence of grand corruption scandals (Ruhl 2011). There 
is some evidence that experiential corruption might have a greater effect on political 
behaviour than perceived corruption (Klasjna et al. 2016) but the latest results in 
Hungary have proved that perceived corruption plays a substantial role in voting 
behaviour (Kostadinova – Kmetty 2018). Thus, in this paper, we focus on perceived 
corruption.  
1 https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
2 For more details see, for example: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/12/how-hungarian-pms-supporters-profit-
from-eu-backed-projects
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The relationship between perceived corruption and political participation is highly 
controversial. Perceptions of corruption may boost participation aimed at removing 
incumbent parties from power, but a high level of perceived corruption might also make 
the incumbent party’s supporters unsure about the value of their votes. Widespread 
perceptions of malfeasance can also decrease trust in the whole political system and 
can cause massive withdrawal from voting. Overall, these complex mechanisms might 
balance each other out (Kostadinova 2009). 
But how do supporters of an incumbent party deal with the corruption affairs of 
a government in power? There are two alternative hypotheses (Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro 2013): one is the information hypothesis, while the other is the trade-off 
hypothesis. As opposed to experienced corruption, political corruption is not part 
of everyday life. If voters are not aware of politicians’ malfeasance, they might easily 
support the party again in the following election. Media investigation of political 
corruption requires plenty of resources, and a lack of the former might leave corrupt 
activities hidden. In addition, the source of the accusations counts. If incumbent 
supporters do not trust sources, they might also mistrust their information. However, 
if they receive credible information about corrupt activities, they might withdraw 
their support. This so-called information hypothesis has not been clearly supported 
by experimental studies that focused on this issue, but more papers have backed the 
hypothesis (Ferraz – Finan 2008, Chong et al 2011, Figueiredo et al 2011, Winters – 
Weitz-Shapiro 2013) than have rejected it (Banerjee et al. 2010). 
The other possible explanation focuses on the overall advantage of supporting the 
incumbent party. Even if the pro-governing party voters are aware of the malfeasance 
of the politician they support they might evaluate this as irrelevant when they cast 
their ballots. Many reasons can be listed here to support this behaviour. If overall 
economic conditions are good in the country and it is on a solid path of development, 
the governing party can withstand even the biggest corruption scandal. This is also 
true if incumbent party voters feel that the other parties are also corrupt, and thus 
perceive that corruption is the nature of politics and it is inevitable that there are 
corruption scandals in a long-term government cycle.  It is also possible that voters 
will not punish their party if they also obtain private goods from the current system 
(Manzetti – Wilson 2007). Several studies have supported this trade-off hypothesis 
(Rundquist et al. 1977, Manzetti – Wilson 2006, Banerjee – Pande 2009), but there 
are contradictory findings too (Winters – Weitz-Shapiro 2013). 
When analyzing the effect of corruption scandals, it is also crucial to understand 
and consider how people get their information about politics and public life. The 
Hungarian political media is polarized and strongly allied along partisan lines (Szabó 
and Kiss 2011). The Fidesz government controls a strongly centralized media system 
which continuously echoes their messages (Bajomi 2013). The country is highly 
polarized (Körösényi 2013), the distance between government and anti-government 
supporters is very wide, and political homophily (Kmetty – Koltai 2012) is very strong. 
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All these factors increase the chance of that “opinion bubbles” will form. Recently, 
many scholars have talked about such opinion bubbles (Iyengar et al. 2012), which 
refer to the fact that people watch/read/listen to only those channels that are in 
line with their own political views and where they find only similar opinions to their 
own. This homogenous opinion milieu significantly decreases the quality of political 
orientation and increases the distance between political sides. Such a fragmented 
political field can strongly hinder political information flow (Pariser 2011). Such a 
political and media space might prevent voters from getting information about 
scandals released to the other side of the political field.
In this paper, we test how polarized media consumption affect incumbent party 
support when voters are confronted with information about real scandals.   
Hypotheses 
Following the unexpected election results in Hungary, we tested whether the 
information hypothesis is relevant in Hungary regarding corruption issues and 
incumbent support. We hypothesized (H1) that if people hear about scandals related 
to the government (negative framing of Fidesz), support for the incumbent party will 
decrease. This is a classic test of the information hypothesis (Ferraz – Finan 2008, 
Chong et al. 2011, Figueiredo et al. 2011, Winters – Weitz-Shapiro). 
Since the media is very polarized in Hungary, and Fidesz has taken over a lot of 
media sources in recent years, we might assume that some voters have not heard 
reports about government-related malfeasance. Based on this, we hypotheses that 
support for the incumbents of those who consume dominantly pro-government 
media will be weaker (H2). 
The first two expectations were built on the information hypothesis. However, we 
wanted to test whether the trade-off hypothesis holds as well. In H3 we hypotheses 
that Fidesz corruption treatment would not affect those who were satisfied with their 
own living conditions (H3a), and/or those who perceived a high level of exposure to 
the corruption of the opposition parties (H3b).  
Design of the experimental surveys 
During the election campaign, we conducted an online survey experiment (Mutz 
2011a). The survey was administered3 between December 12, 2017, and January 10, 
2018, four months before the general election of April 8, 2018. The sample size was 
1000 respondents; the survey was representative for Hungarian internet users aged 
18 or older. 
3 A professional polling company (Marketingcentrum) conducted the survey using their own online panel commissioned by the 
Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Acadeny of Sciences.. 
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The survey was broken down into four sub-samples (see Table 1) each of whose 
respondents we gave different treatments to. The former were asked to read an article 
about a relevant corruption affair connected to one of three political actors. We chose 
scandals which had been heavily cited by news channels within the last one year. The 
present Hungarian political arena is dominated by three political entities (Kovarek 
and Soós 2017): Besides the incumbent party (Fidesz), there is a (formerly) extreme-
right party (Jobbik),4 and a fragmented left political coalition with three bigger 
parties: the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Demokratikus Koalíció (DK), and 
Lehet Más a Politika (LMP). We chose one scandal connected to Fidesz, one scandal 
connected to Jobbik, and one connected to MSZP. The fourth sub-sample was the 
control group which did not receive any treatment. The stories involved real scandals, 
and the articles were based on published news (we simply shortened the texts).5 
Table 1. Structure of the questionnaire design
Fidesz corruption 
treatment (N=255)
Jobbik corruption 
treatment (N=253)
Socialist party (MSZP) 
corruption treatment 
(N=247)
Control group (N=245)
Questions about corruption
Questions about party support and political participation
After the corruption treatment, respondents were asked to evaluate the level of 
corruption in Hungary, the dynamics of the spread of corruption, and the exposure 
to corruption of each party. After this block of questions, respondents provided 
information in response to standard political survey questions such as voting 
intention, party support, party sympathy, etc. 
Analytical strategy and variables 
In the analysis, we fitted multivariate statistic models using the dependent variable 
incumbent (Fidesz) support. We measured Fidesz election support with a dummy 
variable based on the “Which party would you vote for?” question. We coded “1” 
those who said they would vote for Fidesz, and the others “0”. As the dependent 
variable has two categories, binomial logistic regression models were used in the 
analysis.6 To present the results, we calculated the average marginal effect (AME7) of 
the explanatory variables. The AME helps to overcome the problem of interpreting 
4 Jobbik has started to move to the centre from the right over the last few years.
5 For the corruption treatment condition, see the questionnaire. 
6 To test the robustness of our models we calculated all of the models with a  linear predictor too. Results were the same as in 
the case of logistic regression models.  
7 We used the statistical programme R’s margins package (Leeper 2018) to calculate the AME. 
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interaction terms in logistic regressions. To test our hypothesis, we fitted several 
models with different independent variables. 
In Model 1 (M1 – for testing H1) the incumbent corruption treatment (ICT) 
variable was used as an independent variable besides the control variables. The ICT 
variable was coded with two categories: “0” – control group or other party corruption; 
“1” – corruption treatment related to Fidesz corruption.
To test the effect of selective media consumption (M2), we added a composite 
media orientation variable to the first model with two categories: “0” – dominantly 
not pro-government media consumption, “1” – dominantly pro-government media 
consumption.8 To test H2, the interaction term of the ICT variable and the media 
orientation variable was added to the model. 
To test the trade-off hypothesis (M3), we added two additional variables to the M1 
model: opposition parties’ corruption exposure (an 11-category scale ranging from “not 
corrupt at all” (0) to “very corrupt” (10)) and the financial situation of the respondent’s 
household (5-category scale ranging from “we live in financial deprivation” (1) to “we 
live without financial worries” (5)). The interaction term of these two latter variables 
with the treatment variable was added to the model to test H3.
To control the basic demographic variables, gender, age-cohort (three categories) 
settlement type, and education (four categories) variables were included into the 
model. One-quarter of the sample read about a government corruption case, while 
one-quarter of them did not read anything (the control group). The other half of the 
sample was asked to read a news article about scandals involving other parties. To 
control for this effect, two additional dummy variables were included in the models: 
Jobbik corruption treatment and Socialist party corruption treatment. The descriptive 
statistics for the variables are available in Appendix Table A1.
Results
The first regression model (Table1, M1) contains the three treatment variables as 
dummies (the control treatment group was the reference here), the pro-government 
media consumption variable, and the demographic variables. 
8 In the first step, we created four variables:
Watch pro-government television channel news (M1, DunaTV, Tv2)
Watch anti-government television channel news (RTL, HírTV, ATV)
Read pro-government newspapers and news sites (Origo, Lokál, Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Idők)
Read anti-government newspapers and news sites (Index, 24.hu, HVG, 444, Alfahír, Kuruncinfo, Magyar Nemzet, Népszava, 
Vasárnapi Hírek)
We coded as “dominantly pro-government media consumers” those who:
Either watch or read pro-government media sources and do not watch/read any anti-government media sources.
Watch and read pro-government media sources but do not watch and read anti-government media sources together. 
To categorize the sources, we used a classification by Mérték Média Műhely: www.mertek.eu.
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The model was significant (Chi-square sig=0.000), but overall explanatory power 
was quite low (Cox-Snell R Square: 0.074): only the settlement and media consumption 
variables had significant effects. Fidesz had higher support in the county seats and the 
other cities compared to the capital city of Budapest. The media consumption variable 
played the strongest role in the model (based on Wald statistics): those who dominantly 
watch and/or read pro-government media sources support the incumbent party 30 
percentage points more based on the marginal effects. The incumbent corruption 
treatment variable was not significant, and thus the information hypothesis did not 
stand in terms of the whole sample. This represents a rejection of H1.  
Table 2. Binomial logistic regression models. Dependent variable: incumbent voting
  M1 M2 M3
  B Sig. AME B Sig. AME B Sig. AME
Constant -2,543 0,000 -2,453 0,000 -5,615 0,000
Gender -0,152 0,391 -0.020  -0,157  0,376 -0,021 0,096 0,615 0,013
Age: 18-34 -0,119 0,594 -0.015 -0,138 0,539 -0,017 -0,397 0,102 -0,051
Age : 35-49 0,12 0,563 0.016 0,094 0,651 0,013 -0,074 0,738 -0,010
EDU4 - ISCED 
categorization
0,195 0,116 0.026 0,199 0,11 0,026 -0,05 0,713 -0,007
Settlement: county 
seat
0,556 0,047 0.067 0,532 0,057 0,064 0,538 0,07 0,062
Settlement: other 
city
0,589 0,026 0.072 0,567 0,033 0,069 0,668 0,018 0,081
Settlement: village 0,503 0,082 0.06 0,496 0,085 0,059 0,806 0,009 0,101
Treatment: Fidesz -0,362 0,145 -0.048 -0,657 0,026 -0,051 -5,932 0,005 -0,087
Treatment: Jobbik -0,343 0,166 -0.045 -0,349 0,154 -0,046 -0,341 0,189 -0,046
Treatment: Socialist 0,062 0,792 0.008 0,05 0,83 0,007 -0,044 0,862 -0,006
Dominantly pro-
government media
1,602 0,000 0.291 1,379 0,000 0,295      
Treatment: Fidesz 
* Dominantly pro-
government media
      0,993      
Opponent party’s 
corruption exposure
            0,277 0,000 0,05
Treatment: Fidesz 
* Opponent party’s 
corruption exposure
            0,461
Financial situation 
of the household
            0,384 0,002 0,06
Treatment: Fidesz * 
Financial situation 
of the household
            0,304
Model test (Chi2) 0,000 0,000 0,000
Cox and Snell R2 0,074 0,078 0,098
To test if Fidesz corruption treatment played a special role within different segments 
of media consumption groups, we added the interaction term of pro-government 
media consumption and ICT. In this model (Table 2 – M2) the significance level of the 
ICT variable declined to under 0.05 in a negative direction, meaning the treatment 
decreased incumbent support. In the case of the non-linear models, the standard 
calculation of the significance level of the interaction term is biased (Ai-Norton 
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2003) so we omitted it from the tables. It is not easy to understand and interpret an 
interaction term, so we plotted the AME of the Fidesz treatment variable in different 
media environments (see Figure 1). Those respondents who did not read/watch pro-
government media have a negative average marginal effect, but those who live in 
incumbent media bubble have a positive effect.  
Figure 1.: Average marginal effect of Fidesz treatment in the case of different types of 
media consumption
We expected that the corruption treatment would decrease Fidesz support within the 
population who watch and/or read mostly pro-government media, but the findings 
contradicted our expectations. Fidesz support was even higher in the former group. 
This suggests rejecting the information hypothesis, and raises the question why we 
got the entirely opposite result to the one we expected. We come back to this point in 
the discussion.
Our last hypothesis involves the trade-off hypothesis. We expected that individuals 
who live in good economic conditions (H3a) and/or those who feel that the opposition 
parties are (also) corrupt (H3b) would resist the ICT. We tested these hypotheses 
(H3a, H3b) in Model 3 (Table 2 – M3). This model had the greatest explanatory power 
(Cox-Snell R square=0.098). To test H3 we needed to focus on the interaction terms. 
The Fidesz treatment group’s AME value for different levels of economic situation 
was quite uniform with very limited variation, so we rejected H3a. The interaction of 
Fidesz treatment and the opposition party corruption variable was more interesting. 
Figure 2 helps us understand the mechanism here. The ICT did not affect those who 
assumed that opposition parties are corrupt, but for those who did not associate 
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opposition parties with strong corruption, ICT decreased level of support for Fidesz. 
This result reinforces Hypothesis 3b about the trade-off effect. 
Figure 2.:  Average marginal effect of Fidesz treatment on perceptions of different levels of 
opposition party corruption
Discussion 
Fidesz won the recent election of April 2018 in Hungary, and was able to increase their 
proportion of supporters and absolute numbers of voters compared to four years ago. 
During the campaign period, some parts of the media weres full of stories about the 
scandals and corruption affairs of Fidesz which generated an extremely high level of 
interaction in social media (Index 2018). 
An OLAF report was released about the possible corruption exposure of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law (István Tiborcz). Another emblematic government figure, 
Zsolt Semjén, was accused of accepting a high-value invitation to a hunt financed by 
an entrepreneur. Photos of their hunt in Sweden (the shot reindeer was transported 
by helicopter9) dominated the media for several days. However, election results 
showed that these scandals did not decrease incumbent party support. What possible 
explanation is there for this? There is evidence from other experiments (Klasjna – 
Tucker 2013) that in countries where the perception of corruption is very high, new 
scandals or accusations do not change anything. As people already have negative 
opinions about the whole system, and all the parties, they use different criteria when 
they choose between parties. This claim is somewhat similar to that of the trade-off 
9 For the whole story, see: https://budapestbeacon.com/semjen-might-have-illegally-downed-a-reindeer-in-sweden/
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hypothesis which was partly accepted in this paper (H3b). Our results showed clearly 
that those who felt that other parties are also corrupt supported Fidesz at the same 
level in the treatment and the control group. In opposition to the trade-off hypothesis, 
we therefore reject the information hypothesis. The ICT did not affect voting for the 
incumbent (H1). 
The most interesting result came from the analysis of the media consumption 
effect. We hypothesized that the support of those who watch/read dominantly pro-
government media sources for the political incumbents would weaken after the ICT. 
The results showed just the opposite tendency: dominantly pro-government media 
consumers were more inclined to vote for Fidesz in the ICT groups than in the control 
group. What might have happened here? 
There is a growing body of literature that deals with the mechanisms behind 
partisan identity (Janky 2018). Partisanship may influence the selection of 
information, the perceived credibility of sources, and information processing (Mutz 
2011b). If a voter receives information which is not in line with their partisan identity, 
they might refuse to pay attention to it and start collecting counter-arguments 
(Bolsen et al. 2014). As a natural reaction, the partisan respondent recalls their party 
identity and tries to answer any question from this perspective. The literature calls 
this “motivated reasoning” (Leeper – Slothuus 2014). Bechtel et al. (2015) found in 
an experimental study conducted in Switzerland that media-framing associated with 
immigrants alienates different political sides as it leads to recall of the partisanship 
identity of respondents. We might assume the same process in the case of ICT. Those 
who dominantly watch/read pro-government media sources receive a comprehensive 
narrative about events in Hungary. This is a relatively small group (15 percent of the 
sample), but the proportion of Fidesz voters is above 40 percent within this group 
(but only 13 percent of the rest of the sample). When these individuals read a framing 
that is different to the one they are used to hearing, their political identity starts to 
work, and they start to defend their political side. This is a very important finding 
because it might help with understanding why previous experiments and research 
have produced mixed results.
There is other possible explanation for the weak mobilizing effect of ICT. Overall 
perceptions of corruption are very high in Hungary, with all parties considered to be 
corrupt by 70 percent of all voters (Kmetty 2018). When corruption is so widespread, 
voters might feel hopeless about changing the situation. As fighting corruption 
requires collective action, people have to believe that others will also fight against 
corruption. Without this, corruption cannot be a defining phenomenon behind 
political behaviour.
It seems that, despite growing access to online space, media consumption is heavily 
defined by partisanship. Real news and fake news are not always easy to differentiate. 
Politicians have started questioning the truth promoted by media outlets. Trump 
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does this in the USA, and Viktor Orbán does the same in Hungary. This may have 
serious consequences for media consumption and media evaluation. From a research 
perspective, this is an important challenge. When testing the type of treatments 
that we did in this study, we should monitor not just the media consumption of 
respondents but also the evaluation of different media sources from the perspective 
of trustworthiness. 
In our experiment we used real scandals and conducted our survey during 
a campaign period. In a politically more stressful period such as this, recall of 
partisanship identity may be much stronger than in a calmer period. Further research 
is needed to understand this mechanism better.  
Appendix
Table A1.: Descriptive table of main variables
Variable  Response categories Frequency (%)
Party support
Other party, does not vote 82,3
Incumbent party 17,7
     
Media orientation variable
Dominantly non pro-government media 
consumption
84,6
Dominantly pro-government media 
consumption
15,4
     
Gender
male 47
female 53
     
Age (3-cat)
18-34 years 25
35-49 years 28
50+ years 47
     
Settlement
Budapest 21,2
county seat 23,7
other town 32,1
village 23
     
Financial situation
we live in financial deprivation 4,9
we have financial problems every month 14,6
we make ends meet 42,8
get along well financially 32,9
we live without financial worries 4,8
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